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2I. INTRODUCTION
The European Commission’s second infringement decision against Google 
in roughly a year was announced in July 2018, with a record-breaking 
fine of $5.1 billion in Google Android. For competition lawyers and econo-
mists, the Google Android decision is presumably a more conventional, and 
therefore a more easily comprehensible, case than the preceding decision 
in Google Search (Shopping), a decision which the current author likened 
to “fitting a square peg into a round hole” in relation to its fit with the EU 
prohibition of an abuse of a dominant position.2 In Google Android one can 
at least envisage a potentially robust antitrust theory of harm. If a dominant 
undertaking ties its products together to exclude effective competition in 
some of these markets or if it pays off customers to exclude access by 
its efficient competitors to consumers, competition law intervention may, 
indeed, be justified and may conform to existing case law. The central 
question in Google Android is whether on the available facts this appears 
to have happened. Given that there is at least a potentially robust theory of 
harm in Google Android, much depends on the intricate facts of the case. 
As the full decision may take months to be published, this article merely 
offers the author’s initial thoughts on some pertinent aspects of the deci-
sion on the basis of the publicly available information.
This article will not discuss any further the eye-watering fine men-
tioned above (which together with the fine of $2.7 billion in the Google 
Shopping decision from last year would – according to one estimate – 
suffice to fund for almost one year the additional yearly public spending 
necessary to eradicate world hunger by 2030).3 This is because the fine is 
assumed to have been duly calculated on the basis of the Commission’s 
relevant Guidelines,4 and, from a legal and commercial point of view, the 
absolute size of the fine is not as important as the infringing conduct and 
the remedy Google will need to adopt to comply with the decision.
This article proceeds on the premise that the aim of competition 
law is to prevent the exclusion of competitors that are (at least) as efficient 
as the dominant incumbent, whose exclusion would ultimately harm con-
sumers. At one point in time at least, this also seemed to be the guiding 
principle of the Commission’s enforcement priorities in the area of abuse 
of dominance, as expressed in the Guidance on Article 102,5 which ap-
pears to have lost (or never gained) favor as far as the Commission’s actual 
2 P. Akman, “The Theory of Abuse in Google Search: A Positive and Normative Assessment 
under EU Competition Law,” [2017] (2) Journal of Law, Technology and Policy 301, avail-
able at http://illinoisjltp.com/journal/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Akman.pdf.
3 See D. Laborde et al., “Ending Hunger: What Would it Cost?,” International Institute for 
Sustainable Development Briefing Note, October 2016, available at https://www.iisd.org/
sites/default/files/publications/ending-hunger-what-would-it-cost.pdf.
4 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regula-
tion No 1/2003 [2006] OJ C 210/2.
5 Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7.
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decisional practice is concerned.6
II. THE FACTS IN BRIEF
In Google Android, the Commission found Google to be dominant on three different relevant markets and to have engaged in three types of 
abusive conduct. According to the Commission, Google is dominant on the relevant markets for: (1) general internet search services; (2) licens-
able smart mobile operating systems; and, (3) app stores for the Android mobile operating system. The three types of conduct found abusive, 
as expressed by the Commission, are: (1) illegal tying of Google’s search and browser apps; (2) illegal payments to device manufacturers and 
mobile network operators conditional on exclusive pre-installation of Google Search; and, (3) illegal obstruction of development and distribution 
of competing Android operating systems.
III. MARKET DEFINITION AND COMPETITIVE CONSTRAINTS
The premise of the case is that Google used its dominance in the Google Play Store (which enables users to download apps onto their Android 
phones) to “cement Google’s dominant position in general internet search.”7
It is interesting that the case appears to concern a dominant undertaking leveraging its dominance from a market in which it is dominant 
(app stores for the Android mobile operating system) into another market in which it is also dominant (internet search).8 As far as this author is 
aware, most (if not all) previous cases of tying in the EU to date concerned tying where the dominant undertaking leveraged its dominance in one 
market to distort or eliminate competition in another, otherwise competitive market. Thus, for example, in Microsoft (Windows Operating System 
–> media players), Hilti (patented cartridge strips –> nails), and Tetra Pak II (packaging machines –> non-aseptic cartons), the tied market was 
actually or potentially competitive, and this was why the tying was alleged to have eliminated competition on the separate market for the tied 
product.9 It will be interesting to see which case the Commission uses as precedent in its decision. The question of precedent will be returned 
to later.
A “tying” theory of harm would have made more sense had the Commission argued that Google Play Store is the “tying product” while the 
Google Search App and Chrome App were the “tied products.” This would have required the Commission to have defined separate markets for 
these three products, but as noted above, these do not appear to be the relevant markets as defined by the Commission.
It is also noteworthy that the Commission does not appear to have defined a separate mobile search market that would have been com-
petitive but for Google’s alleged leveraging. The market has been defined as the general internet search market. So, according to the Commis-
sion, the Google Search App and Google Search engine appear to be one and the same thing, and desktop and mobile devices are equivalent (or 
substitutable). Finding mobile and desktop devices to be equivalent to one another may have implications for other cases including the ongoing 
appeal in Google Shopping where, for example, the Commission found that “[m]obile [apps] are not a viable alternative for replacing generic 
search traffic from Google’s general search results pages” for comparison shopping services.10 The argument that mobile apps and mobile traffic 
are fundamental aspects of the search market in Google Android but trivial in Google Shopping may not play out favorably for the Commission 
before the Court of Justice of the EU. These two different interpretations of the same set of facts cannot both be simultaneously correct.
6 See P. Akman, “The Reform of the Application of Article 102 TFEU: Mission Accomplished?,” (2016) 81 Antitrust Law Journal 145 for the (lack) of use of the Guidance in 
decisional practice; and see P. Akman, “The European Commission’s Guidance on Article 102TFEU: From Inferno to Paradiso?,” (2010) 73(4) Modern Law Review 605 for an 
assessment of the Guidance.
7 European Commission Press Release “Commission fines Google €4.34 billion for illegal practices regarding Android mobile devices to strengthen dominance of Google’s 
search engine,” July 18, 2018, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4581_en.htm.
8 This point would be valid if the theory was the other way around, too. Namely, if the theory of harm was the Google was leveraging its dominance in internet search into the 
market for app stores for Android.
9 Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft (March 24, 2004) http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/37792/37792_4177_1.pdf; Case IV/30.787 and 31.488 
Eurofix-Bauco v. Hilti (December 22, 1987) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A31988D0138; Case IV/31043 Tetra Pak II (July 24, 1991) https://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:31992D0163.
10 Case AT.39740 Google Search (Shopping) (June 27, 2017) http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_14996_3.pdf [568].
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Another interesting market definition point is that the Commission has found Apple not to be a competitor to Google in the relevant market 
defined by the Commission: the market for “licensable smart mobile operating systems.” Apple does not fall within that market because Apple 
does not license its mobile operating system to anyone: Apple’s business model itself eliminates all possibility of competition from the start and 
is by definition exclusive.
Although there is some internal logic in the Commission’s exclusion of Apple from the upstream market that it has defined (which relates 
to the licensing of Android to device manufacturers), it represents a definitional stop. Once the Commission defined the market as that of “licens-
able smart mobile operating systems,” it was a given that Apple was not going to be part of the same market. This is because Apple allows only 
itself to use its operating system on devices that only Apple itself manufactures. Real markets do not come defined, and the market definition 
that the Commission appears to have adopted was certainly not the only feasible market definition possible. Had the market been defined as the 
market for smart mobile operating systems, Apple would have been found to be part of the same market. The realistic possibility of an equally 
valid, alternative market definition arises out of the fact that even the Commission itself considers there to be some competition between Apple 
and Android devices at the level of consumers.11
The Commission does not consider the level of competition for end users (downstream) to be sufficient to constrain Google’s market pow-
er for licensing of Android at the upstream, manufacturer level. The Commission reaches this conclusion mainly through an assessment of factors 
related to consumers’ decisions in choosing an Android versus Apple device (such as price, branding, switching costs, etc.). However, all of these 
factors relate to, first, competition between devices, as well as between operating systems, which oversimplifies the facts of competition on the 
market as Google only manufactures a small fraction of Android devices whereas Apple manufactures all of Apple devices. Thus, the factors 
listed by the Commission which relate to a choice between an Android device and an Apple device is more complicated than presented because 
numerous other manufacturers with their numerous different brands, prices ranges, etc. play a role in that competition on the downstream mar-
ket. In fact, the factors listed in order to establish whether Google’s market power upstream is constrained by competition on the downstream 
market include factors that are endogenous to the players on the upstream market against whom the Commission is arguably measuring Goo-
gle’s market power (such as the device brand, hardware features, price range, etc.). The point is that to measure Google’s market power against 
device manufacturers on the upstream level, one would need to consider Apple as a potential threat to Google on the upstream level, not on the 
downstream level. This requires an assessment of supply-side substitutability, not demand-side substitutability as the Commission’s assessment 
appears to adopt. Therefore, the pertinent question is whether Apple constrains Google on the upstream, manufacturer level in that if Apple iOS 
became an alternative to Android for third-party device manufacturers, this would constrain Google’s market power on the upstream level.
Although the Commission prioritizes demand-side substitutability in market definition, its own guidance on the topic notes that
[s]upply-side substitutability may also be taken into account when defining markets in those situations in which its effects are 
equivalent to those of demand substitution in terms of effectiveness and immediacy. This means that suppliers are able to switch 
production to the relevant products and market them in the short term….12
Apple could – presumably – rather immediately and at minimal cost produce and market a version of iOS for use on third-party device makers’ 
devices. By the Commission’s own definition, it would seem to make sense to include Apple in the relevant market. Nevertheless, it has apparently 
not done so here. If this is a finding based on evidence, namely that Apple could not within a reasonable time period offer a licensable version of 
iOS to third-party manufacturers, then the market definition may, indeed, be correct. If, however, the Commission’s finding is based on a cate-
gorical rejection of Apple as a potential upstream competitor on the basis of characteristics of the downstream market (which mix factors related 
to consumers’ purchasing decisions with factors related to manufacturers’ endogenous decisions), then, conceptually, the market definition 
reached in the case would be problematic.13
11 See Press Release, supra note 7.
12 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law (97/C 372/03) [1997] OJ C372/5, [20].
13 See also the Commission’s listing of the fact that Google Search is the default search engine on Apple devices and thus, users’ switching from Android to Apple devices 
having a limited impact on Google’s core business as a factor which shows that competition downstream does not constrain Google’s market power upstream. It is difficult to 
comprehend what aspect of this fact relates to the potential exercise of Google’s market power upstream (i.e. against the manufacturers) as opposed to relating to a possible 
outcome of the conduct under investigation (namely Google Search being pre-installed/default search app on the relevant device).
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IV. IS GOOGLE ANDROID REALLY A TYING CASE AND IS MICROSOFT REALLY THE RELEVANT 
PRECEDENT?
Given that Google Android appears to revolve around the idea of tying and leveraging, the EU Commission’s infringement decision against Micro-
soft, which found an abusive tie in Microsoft’s tying of Windows Operating System with Windows Media Player, appears to be the most obvious 
starting point in terms of the relevant precedent, at least for the tying part of the case.
There are, however, potentially important factual differences between the two cases. To take just a few examples:
• Microsoft charged for the Windows Operating System, whereas Google does not;
• Microsoft tied the setting of Windows Media Player as the default to OEMs’ licensing of the operating system (Windows), whereas Google 
ties the pre-installation/setting of Search as the default to device makers’ use of other Google apps, while allowing them to use the op-
erating system (Android) without any Google apps; and
• Downloading competing media players was difficult due to download speeds and lack of user familiarity, whereas it is trivial and common-
place for users to download apps that compete with Google’s.
Moreover, there are also some conceptual hurdles in finding the conduct to be that of tying.
First, the difference between “pre-installed,” “default,” and “exclusive” clearly matters a lot in establishing whether effective competition 
has been foreclosed. It is one thing for a dominant undertaking to request to be the “exclusive” provider of services and pay for this exclusivity, 
but it is quite another thing for its services to be pre-installed without requiring exclusivity or default status if competitors’ services can also be 
provided alongside its own. Pre-installation without default status or exclusivity may incentivize (rather than reduce) competition if competitors 
can also, for example, pay device manufacturers to have their apps pre-installed on their devices. The facts relating to this part of Android are not 
clear from the publicly available information. The Commission’s Press Release notes that to pre-install Google Play, manufacturers have to also 
pre-install Google Search App and Google Chrome.14 It also states that Google Search is the default search engine on Google Chrome. The Press 
Release does not indicate that Google Search App has to be the exclusive or default search app on the relevant device. It is worth noting, how-
ever, that the Statement of Objections in Google Android did allege that Google violated EU competition rules by requiring Search to be installed 
as the default.15 We will have to await the decision itself to see if this was dropped from the case or simply not mentioned in the Press Release.
In fact, the fact that the other infringement found is that of Google’s making payments to manufacturers in return for exclusively pre-in-
stalling the Google Search App indirectly suggests that not every manufacturer pre-installs Google Search App as the exclusive, pre-installed 
search app. This means that any other search app (provider) can also (request to) be pre-installed on these devices. The same goes for the 
browser app.
Of course, regardless, even if the manufacturer does not pre-install competing apps, the consumer is free to download any other app – for 
search or browsing – as they wish, and can do so in seconds.
In short, pre-installation on its own does not necessarily foreclose competition, and thus may not constitute an illegal tie under EU compe-
tition law. This is particularly so when download speeds are fast (unlike the case at the time of Microsoft) and consumers regularly do download 
numerous apps.
What may, however, potentially foreclose effective competition is where a dominant undertaking makes payments to stop its customers, 
as a practical matter, from selling its rivals’ products. Intel, for example, was found to have abused its dominant position through payments to a 
computer retailer in return for its not selling computers with its competitor AMD’s chips, and to computer manufacturers in return for delaying 
14 See Press Release, supra note 7.
15 European Commission Press Release “Commission sends Statement of Objections to Google on Android operating system and applications,” April 20, 2016, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1492_en.htm.
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the launch of computers with AMD chips.16
In Google Android, the exclusivity provision that would require manufacturers to pre-install Google Search App exclusively in return for 
financial incentives may be deemed to be similar to this.
Having said that, unlike in Intel where a given computer can only have a CPU from one given manufacturer, even the exclusive pre-in-
stallation of the Google Search App would not have prevented consumers from downloading competing apps. In fact, one need not download a 
search app to search the web, either, as this can be done by using the browser to navigate to one’s preferred search site.17 So, again, in theory 
effective competition from other search apps need not have been foreclosed.
It must also be noted that just because a Google app is pre-installed does not mean that it generates any revenue to Google – consumers 
have to actually choose to use that app as opposed to another one that they might prefer in order for Google to earn any revenue from it. The 
Commission seems to place substantial weight on pre-installation, which it alleges creates “a status quo bias.”18
The concern with this approach is that it is not possible to know whether those consumers who do not download competing apps do so 
out of a preference for Google’s apps or, instead, for other reasons that might indicate that competition is not working. Indeed, one hurdle as 
regards conceptualizing the infringement as tying is that it would require establishing that a significant number of phone users would actually 
prefer to use Google Play Store (the tying product) without Google Search App (the tied product).
This is because according to the Commission’s Guidance Paper, establishing tying starts with identifying two distinct products, and 
[t]wo products are distinct if, in the absence of tying or bundling, a substantial number of customers would purchase or would have 
purchased the tying product without also buying the tied product from the same supplier.19
Thus, if a substantial number of customers would not want to use Google Play Store without also preferring to use Google Search App, this would 
cause a conceptual problem for making out a tying claim.
In fact, the conduct at issue in Google Android may be closer to a refusal to supply type of abuse. This would imply that the allegedly 
abusive conduct in question is Google’s refusal to supply the Play Store without strings (i.e. apps) attached. For a refusal to supply to be abusive, 
the dominant undertaking must refuse to supply (without objective justification) an indispensable input, without access to which all competition 
in the relevant market on the part of the person requesting access is likely to be eliminated.20 Indeed, the Commission notes that the Play Store 
is a “must-have” app for device manufacturers.21 Such a theory of harm may, in fact, also make more sense given the observation above that 
the case as it stands appears to be built on a theory of a monopolist tying two products over both of which it is a monopolist, which is unusual 
in terms of existing precedent. 
Refusal to supply also seems to make more sense regarding the prevention of the development of Android forks being found to be an 
abuse. In this context, it will be interesting to see how the Commission overcomes the argument that Android forks can be developed freely and 
Google may have legitimate business reasons in wanting to associate its own, proprietary apps only with a certain, standardized-quality version 
of the operating system.
16 Case COMP/37.990 Intel (May 13, 2009) http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/37990/37990_3581_18.pdf.
17 This also raises a question about the relevance of the Commission’s statements in relation to users of Windows Mobile devices making less than 25 percent of their searches 
using Google Search app as it appears that the Commission is only comparing search activity taking place on search apps rather than search activity taking place through the use 
of navigation to a search site and through the use of the app. In other words, it is possible that even on Windows Mobile devices, more people use Google to search than Bing, 
if one considers all the means through which the user access a search site. This, obviously, can only be established by empirical data on search conduct. See Press Release, 
supra note 7, in relation to the use of the search app on Windows mobile devices.
18 See Press Release, supra note 7.
19 Guidance Paper, supra note 5 [51].
20 Case Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG, Mediaprint Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG and 
Mediaprint Anzeigengesellschaft mbH & Co KG ECLI:EU:C:1998:569.
21 See Press Release, supra note 7.
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More importantly, the possible underlying theory in this part of the case is that the Google apps in question – and perhaps even the 
licensed version of Android – are a “must-have” for device manufacturers, which is close to an argument that they are an essential facility in the 
context of Android phones. But, that would indeed require a refusal to supply type of abuse to be established, which does not appear to be the 
Commission’s theory of harm.
V. IMPLICATIONS
In earlier writing, the current author had predicted that Google may start charging for Android as a result of the Commission’s decision.22 That 
prediction has, indeed, materialized to a degree: Google has recently announced that it will charge for licensing the apps for Android including 
the Play Store in response to the Commission’s decision.23 This is not a surprising reaction because unbundling Google Play Store, Google 
Search App and Google Chrome (to allow manufacturers to pre-install Google Play Store without the latter two) will disrupt Google’s main rev-
enue streams (i.e. ad revenue generated through the use of Google Search App or Google Search within the Chrome app) which funds the free 
operating system.
The outcome as things stand so far clearly raises questions as to whether the European Commission’s Google Android decision will 
ultimately benefit consumers. Given that the Commission does not seem to think that Apple constrains Google when it comes to dealings with 
device manufacturers, in theory, Google should be able to charge up to the monopoly level licensing fee to device manufacturers for the apps in 
question. If that happens, the price of Android smartphones may (but need not) go up depending on how much of this price rise can be passed 
onto consumers by device manufacturers. Similarly, app developers may face increasing costs due to the forking of Android. It is also possible 
that there is a new competitor lurking in the woods that will grow and constrain the potential exercise of market power. However, the message 
that the Commission sends with Google Android to that potential entrant is that a walled-garden built on complete vertical integration of propri-
etary devices bundled with a proprietary app store is a safer place to be in terms of potential competition law scrutiny than providing an open 
source and freely available product. This message is somewhat ironic as the walled-garden model of Apple is by definition uncompetitive. Both 
the alternative model of the walled-garden and Google’s attempts at generating revenue from an open source model raise important questions 
about the validity of potential objective justifications that will be raised by undertakings adopting such different business models. None of Google’s 
proposed justifications appears to have been accepted by the Commission in Google Android, and objective justification has a very poor record in 
abuse of dominance proceedings in Europe. Cases like Google Android where conduct takes place on technology markets with different business 
models of monetization where certain practices are argued to be essential to fund otherwise “free” services and products put new emphasis on 
the importance of what counts as objective justification in such cases. The role of commercial justifications and their assessment by European 
authorities, as well as the practical effects of decisions such as Google Android on consumers remain interesting developments to watch out for 
in the coming months and years.
22 See P. Akman, “Will the European Commission’s Google Android Decision Benefit Consumers?,” July 19, 2018, available at https://truthonthemarket.com/2018/07/19/
will-the-european-commissions-google-android-decision-benefit-consumers/.
23 See H. Lockheimer, “Complying with the EC’s Android decision,” October 16, 2018, available at https://www.blog.google/around-the-globe/google-europe/complying-ecs-an-
droid-decision/.
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